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1 Introduction
In the post-war period, the Netherlands regarded itself an ‘overpopulated’
country. Both public opinion and government documents explicitly stated
that the Netherlands was not – and should not become – an immigration
country (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Volksgezondheid 1970). To the
contrary, emigration was openly encouraged through government policies
and, between 1946 and 1972, more than half a million Dutch citizens emi-
grated to countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
Nevertheless, during that same period, the Netherlands did in fact become
an immigration country. Migration statistics show that from the beginning
of the 1960s, with the sole exception of the depression of 1967, the coun-
try’s net migration balance was consistently positive until 2004, with immi-
grants arriving in different periods and for various reasons.
This chapter begins with an overview of migration waves to the
Netherlands, provided more or less in chronological order. Following the
introduction, the second section describes the evolution of Dutch immigra-
tion and integration policies over the years. The third section reconstructs
the processes of immigration policymaking, while the fourth section deals
with integration policymaking. The analysis considers the different pro-
cesses, actors, levels and governance patterns that have influenced policies
in each of these domains. The chapter’s fifth section compares the
dynamics of the immigration and integration fields, evaluating their inter-
action and, in so doing, identifying two types of factors that shape their
dynamics. While the fourth section focuses on the internal mechanisms of
migration and integration, the sixth section emphasises the role of various
external factors such as the welfare state policies, the political framework
and the political climate. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of
the Dutch case’s most salient characteristics.
The first migrants to arrive to the Netherlands were so-called repatriates
who came from the Dutch East Indies, or what today are Indonesia and
New Guinea. Their arrival was a consequence of the decolonisation pro-
cess taking place in the former Dutch colonies. In total, this population
was estimated to comprise approximately 300,000 individuals in the years
spanning 1946 to 1962. Most repatriates were of mixed Indonesian-Dutch
descent, being entitled to settle in the Netherlands on the grounds of their
Dutch citizenship. In general, they were well educated and had strong so-
cio-cultural and national orientations towards the Netherlands. Their inte-
gration was helped by the active and assimilationist reception and settle-
ment policy that was transpiring under the expanding economy and labour
market conditions of the 1960s (Van Amersfoort 1982; Van Amersfoort &
Van Niekerk 2006).
In 1951, under pressure of political developments in Indonesia, a second
group of migrants arrived to the Netherlands. This group comprised
Moluccan soldiers from the former colonial armed forces and their family
members. Totalling 12,500 individuals, the migrants themselves and the
Dutch government both regarded their stay as temporary because, after all,
the Moluccans had intended to return to a free republic of the Moluccas.
As such, conditions for this group’s adjustment to Dutch society were very
unfavourable. Various contingencies included the government’s policy to
keep the group intact (in view of their anticipated return migration), the
group’s own seemingly firm intent to return to their native land, as well as
their dismissal from the army, low level of education and lack of Dutch
language skills (Bartels 1989). Since a free republic of the Moluccas never
came to exist, the migrants’ desired return did not materialise. In 1978,
after a series of violent occupations of buildings and hijackings of trains
by Moluccan youth, policy objectives were explicitly altered (Entzinger
1985; Penninx 1979). Social, cultural and political orientations among
Moluccans also changed (Bartels 1989; Steijlen 1996; Smeets & Steijlen
2006). Today, Moluccan immigrants and their descendants in the
Netherlands are an estimated population of 42,300 (CBS 2002: 15).
The post-colonial migrations described above were followed by de-
mand-driven labour migration from the late 1950s on. Already by the mid-
1950s, post-war reconstruction efforts started to produce labour shortages
in certain sectors and guest workers were recruited to fill vacancies. Most
were jobs for unskilled or low-skilled workers: first came Italians, followed
by Spaniards and Yugoslavs and, still later, Turks and North Africans. The
first oil crisis of 1973 led to a factual recruitment stop for workers, though
this did not mean a decrease in immigration. Although return migration for
Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Greek and Yugoslav migrants was quite high
during the 1970s, the Turkish and Moroccan response differed. From the
mid-1970s onwards, these workers brought their families to the
Netherlands. Meanwhile, from the mid-1980s onwards, other migrants
came as spouses for the young Turkish and Moroccan immigrants who had
settled in the Netherlands. By 1 January 2006, the number of residents of
Turkish background1 in the Netherlands was 364,300, 54 per cent of whom
were born in Turkey (these residents are thus considered first-generation
130 BRUQUETAS-CALLEJO, GARCÉS-MASCAREÑAS, PENNINX & SCHOLTEN
migrants) and 46 per cent of whom had at least one parent who was born
in Turkey (thus being considered second-generation migrants). By 1
January 2006, Dutch residents of Moroccan background were counted at
323,200, 52 per cent of whom comprise first-generation migrants and 48
per cent, second-generation. The large majority of this population had also
acquired Dutch nationality.
The next newcomers to the Netherlands were Surinamese. Up until
1975, Surinam formed part of the Netherlands Kingdom and migration was
unregulated. Immigration from Surinam intensified from 1973 to 1975,
during the years before the country’s independence, and again from 1979
to 1980, prior to expiration of the transitional agreement on the settlement
of mutual subjects of Surinam and the Netherlands. The political turmoil in
Surinam in 1982 and the country’s political instability thereafter brought
new immigrants to the Netherlands, although at a lower rate than during
the aforementioned peak periods (Van Amersfoort & Van Niekerk 2006).
The population of Surinamese origin in the Netherlands, as of 1 January
2006, amounted to 331,900, 56 per cent of whom would be considered the
first generation and 44 per cent the second generation. A great majority of
present-day Surinamese residents have Dutch nationality.
Migration from the Dutch Antilles has not been hampered by regulations
because the islands are part of the Netherlands, and Antilleans therefore
hold Dutch nationality. Migration movements have long been rather fluid,
and return migration among the population is relatively high. As of 1
January 2006, the number of residents of Antillean origin in the
Netherlands totalled 129,700. This group’s relatively recent arrival is re-
flected in the high percentage comprising the first generation, at 62 per
cent, and a comparatively small percentage comprising the second genera-
tion, at 38 per cent.
Since the mid-1980s, admitted asylum seekers and other refugee popula-
tions have become an increasingly significant share of the Netherlands’ im-
migrant population. Such groups first began arriving from Vietnam, Sri
Lanka and the Horn of Africa, and later, from the Middle East and the
Balkans. As of 1 January 2006, admitted refugees and asylum applicants
to the Netherlands most frequently came from: Iraq (43,800), Afghanistan
(37,200), Iran (28,700), Somalia (19,900) and Ghana (19,500).
In addition to the above-mentioned categories of migrants, other immi-
grants continued to settle in the Netherlands. As of 1 January 2006, the to-
tal number of Dutch residents whose background would be considered one
of the EU-25 countries rose to 817,000. The number of residents with a
background in one of the so-called ‘Western’ countries (including those in
the EU) is 1.42 million, or 8.7 per cent of the total population. ‘Non-
Western allochthones’ numbered at 1.72 million, or 10.5 per cent of the to-
tal population.
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Despite the fact that since World War II the Netherlands has not re-
garded itself an immigration country, many immigrants have in fact settled
in the nation. In all, there are now 691,500 aliens (i.e. persons not having
Dutch nationality) living in the Netherlands (4.2 per cent of the country’s
total population). Of the total population, 1.6 million people (9 per cent)
were born outside the Netherlands; these individuals are considered ‘immi-
grants’ in the strict sense of the term. Meanwhile, 3.15 million (19.3 per
cent) are, in the broad definition of the word, allochthones (i.e. first- and
second-generation migrants). These newcomers to Dutch society are scat-
tered throughout the country’s geography. To illustrate, in 2000, 40 per
cent of all allochthones were living in one of the Netherlands’ four largest
cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Utrecht). By contrast, only 13
per cent of the total Dutch population were recorded as residents of these
cities. In general, immigrants to the Netherlands have tended to settle in
larger cities, most notably, in the western conurbation of the Netherlands
(CBS 2001; Garssen 2006: 19).
2 The evolution of migration policies
The fact that the Netherlands did not see itself as an immigration country
is manifested in the various ways the nation went about naming factual im-
migrants. People from the Dutch East Indies were labelled ‘repatriates’;
from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles,2 ‘Kingdom fellows’ (rijksge-
noten in Dutch); and from Southern Europe, Morocco and Turkey, ‘guest
workers’. This same national self-perception was also expressed in the
noted absence of integration policies for alien newcomers throughout the
1960s and 1970s (Blok Commission 2004). Apart from repatriates from
the Dutch East Indies who were, after all, Dutch citizens, all other newco-
mers’ stays were seen as temporary, thereby deeming sufficient what were
merely ad hoc policies for accommodation and return.
However, the Netherlands’ reputation of not being an immigration coun-
try contradicted the undeniable fact that large immigrant groups were stay-
ing in the nation for long periods of time, if not permanently. This led to
mounting tensions in the mid-1970s (Entzinger 1975), and produced a gra-
dual shift in integration policies. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the pre-
sence of long-term factual immigrants began to be recognised and it there-
fore became a major political goal to integrate such individuals into Dutch
society. This led to designation and implementation of the first integration
policies in the Netherlands, collectively referred to as the Ethnic Minorities
(EM) Policy. During the 1980s, EM Policy started, much as it had in
Sweden, as a welfare state policy to stimulate equality and equity among a
society’s vulnerable groups. It was developed in a relatively depoliticised
political context and laid down in a number of governmental documents
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(Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1980, 1981, 1983). In its implementa-
tion phase during the 1980s, this policy led to significant policy activity
across many domains.
Although the presence of large immigrant groups was recognised, immi-
gration was still seen as a historically unique event. It was, moreover, be-
lieved that further immigration should be restricted or prevented (Penninx,
Garcés-Mascareñas & Scholten 2005). The policy shift towards integration
thus did not imply that the current immigration was recognised any differ-
ently. Alongside the realisation of integration policies, the 1980s and
1990s implemented and enforced more restrictive immigration policies vis-
à-vis labour migration, and later on, family migration and asylum. Since
there was no discussion on whether the Netherlands should be an immigra-
tion country or not, throughout the two decades, increasingly restrictive im-
migration policies were formulated and applied in a rather de-politicised
context. In other words, compared to integration policies, new immigration
regulations were, until recently, passed with little political debate and rela-
tively low implication of different political and social actors.
Towards the end of the 1980s, the public and the political discourses
started to look critically at EM Policy. The policy was seen as having
failed in important areas of labour and education, while also being criti-
cised for its common concern (target groups and their emancipation) and
its ‘overemphasis on cultural aspects’. This resulted in the formulation of
integration policies throughout the 1990s. The new policy document
known as ‘Contourennota’ (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1994) ac-
centuated the individual over the group, emphasised the socio-economic
aspects of integration over the cultural and/or religious ones and stressed,
more than before, the civic responsibilities of individuals in integration
processes. This led to new directions of policy implementation during the
1990s including, among others, a national policy of introductory courses
for newcomers in Dutch society and area-based policies (i.e. urban
policies).
The beginning of the new century prepared for another shift in policy or-
ientation that was by then embedded in full-fledged politicisation of the to-
pics of immigration and integration. That integration processes and policies
had fundamentally failed and that social cohesion of Dutch society had be-
come endangered became the dominant perception. National election cam-
paigns in 2002 framed these topics in advantageously exploitative lights
and thus reinforced politicisation of the themes. Only fanning the fire were
internationally and nationally scoped events, such as 9/11 and the 2004
murder of Dutch film-maker Theo Van Gogh by a young Dutch-born radi-
cal Muslim in Amsterdam. With the formulation of Integration Policy New
Style (Ministerie van Justitie 2003), a series of proposals and measures
were developed to significantly bring down immigration figures (the
Netherlands had a negative net migration balance for the three consecutive
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years following 2004), and to introduce mandatory forms of integration for
newcomers and oldcomers alike. Some observers have called these prac-
tices neo-assimilationist.
3 Immigration policymaking
In contradistinction to integration policies in the Netherlands, immigration
policies have been neither comprehensive nor coordinated. This has been
due to the lack of a clear policymaking structure, which has thus led to the
formulation of labour, family and asylum migration policies by different
ministries, institutions and other political and social actors. Also at play
have been varying dynamics, all transpiring at distinct moments in time.
For instance, while the Ministry of Justice is responsible for general admis-
sion of foreigners and the granting of their residence permits, the Ministry
of Social Affairs and Employment is assigned to deal particularly with la-
bour migration, and the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work
has competency over reception of asylum seekers. Consequentially, any de-
scription of Dutch immigration policy must refer to three distinctly as-
signed processes: labour, family and asylum. Interactions between these
three processes have taken place over the course of time, but their interrela-
tions have neither been stable nor held within a unitary structure. The fol-
lowing sections outline these developments and detail their points of
convergence.
3.1 Labour migration
By the mid-1950s, the post-war reconstruction efforts of the Netherlands
had led to labour shortages in various sectors. This resulted in the recruit-
ment of foreign workers to fill these vacancies, which were mainly jobs for
unskilled or low-skilled workers. To this end, recruitment agreements were
signed with sending countries such as Italy (1960), Spain (1961), Portugal
(1963), Turkey (1964), Greece (1966), Morocco (1969) and Yugoslavia
(1970). These arrangements were formulated in consensual agreement
among the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, employers’ organi-
sations and trade unions. As in other Western European countries, social
partners and the state generally accepted the fact that continuous economic
growth could only be achieved by relying on (presumably) temporary for-
eign labour.
Recruitment activities came to an end, however, upon onset of the eco-
nomic recession that followed the first oil crisis in 1973. This was more
the result of a lack of employers’ interest in new foreign workers than the
consequence of an explicit immigration policy (De Lange 2007). Unlike in
France and Germany, measures to force migrant workers to return home
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were never implemented in the Netherlands. The Dutch government’s pro-
posal to introduce a return bonus for those who would return voluntarily
was broadly rejected. And while, from 1973 onwards, the Netherlands pro-
claimed itself closed to labour migration, this declaration was more a mat-
ter of rhetoric than factual policy. Labour migration policies (the Labour of
Foreign Workers Act from 1979 to 1995, and the Labour of Aliens Act
from 1995 onwards) continued to channel the entrance of those workers
deemed beneficial to the Dutch labour market. In a new economic context
characterised by a loss of employment in industry and a parallel expansion
of the service sector, these policies were meant to restrict the entrance of
low-skilled foreign workers while channelling that of high-skilled immi-
grants, often from highly industrialised countries (Böcker & Clermonts
1995).
In contrast to the 1950s and 1960s when corporatist structures were fully
functioning, labour migration policies were formulated by the Ministry of
Social Affairs and Employment, with little cooperation from trade unions
and employers. For instance, the Labour of Foreign Workers Act was
passed in 1979 despite criticisms by both employers’ organisations and
trade unions. The weakening of the corporatist structure allowed
Parliament, and hence its vying political parties, to gain clout in labour mi-
gration policymaking. The parliamentary discussions on the Labour of
Foreign Workers Act of 1979 illustrate how labour immigration policies
were increasingly created by the government and discussed at length in
Parliament. Unlike previous measures, this new law was widely debated.
Left-wing parties, left-wing liberals and the liberal party were opposed to
the law, arguing that it would negatively affect the position of foreign
workers and institutionalise unequal treatment.
By the end of the 1980s, persistent labour shortages in particular eco-
nomic sectors forced the Dutch government to deal with the demand for
foreign labour in a more structured fashion. As a consequence of this, the
Dutch Employment Organisation, together with trade unions and employ-
ers, started to manage temporary labour migration through so-called ‘cove-
nants’. These tripartite agreements permitted workers in particular econom-
ic sectors to be temporarily admitted into the country, while also anticipat-
ing the availability of newly trained, qualified Dutch workers. Contrary to
what would be expected, however, these agreements did not always lead to
more liberal admission policy (De Lange 2004). In terms of policymaking,
these covenants reinstated the corporatist tripartite body.
Parallel to measures designed to control the admission of foreign work-
ers, the Dutch government has aimed to reduce irregular immigration since
the early 1990s. The Linkage Act (1998) became centrepiece to the princi-
ple of an ‘integrated immigration policy’ (Pluymen 2004: 76). This mea-
sure made all social security benefits contingent upon an immigrant’s legal
residence status, including rights and access to secondary or higher
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education, housing, rent subsidy, handicapped facilities and health care.
Driving this act was the assumption that exclusion of access to public ser-
vices would help push back irregular migration.
While previous measures to reduce irregular migration passed with little
public discussion, beyond Parliament, the Linkage Act generated wide-
spread protest from doctors, teachers, legal experts, prominent politicians
and representatives from a broad range of public, semi-private and private
organisations. Representatives of local governments also campaigned
against the new law and seemed to steer a course for non-enforcement. In
general terms, the new law was claimed to be unnecessary, immoral and
unworkable. This general opposition – in contrast to the ramifications of
creating other labour migration policies – produced a number of substantial
alterations to the bill. For instance, professionals were not forced to report
irregular immigrants to the Aliens Department; restrictions concerning edu-
cation for children were lifted; and whereas irregular immigrants would in-
itially have only been entitled to medical care in ‘acute and threatening si-
tuations’, this specification was eventually superseded by the prospect of
requiring ‘imperative medical treatment’.
Moreover, in its implementation, the Linkage Act led to the inclusion of
other actors. First of all, private actors became master-workers of its imple-
mentation, since it was they who were to control the access to social ser-
vices. Having private actors participate in migration management meant
they could simultaneously work to influence the actual process of imple-
mentation. For instance, various studies (Van der Leun 2003, 2006;
Pluymen 2004) have shown how workers in the domain of social assis-
tance and housing have displayed a much more accepting attitude towards
the Linkage Act than doctors and teachers who, in contrast, might tend to-
wards letting their professional ethics prevail over new regulations.
Secondly, the exclusion of undocumented immigrants from social services
led to the shift of new support activities downwards, both in the direction
of local authorities and out to churches and other support organisations. In
other words, local funds and churches, societal organisations and private
individuals came forward to support irregular immigrants in those services
no longer being covered by the Dutch state.
3.2 Family migration
Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the assumption that labour migra-
tion in the Netherlands was temporary led to relatively strict regulations re-
garding family reunification. Although family immigration was not yet a
main preoccupation during the 1970s, when evoked in parliamentary
debates, the issue was discussed within a framework of highly moral dis-
course (Bonjour 2006: 4). In particular, Christian parties regularly empha-
sised the importance of taking into account the ‘human’ and the ‘social’
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aspects of labour migration, referring to the ‘forced’ separation of guest
workers from their families as ‘extremely painful’ and a source of ‘suffer-
ing’ (quoted in ibid.). Despite explicitly voiced concerns over family unity,
the government did not alter family migration regulations, arguing that cir-
cumstances unfortunately did not allow for less ‘strict policies’ (ibid.: 5).
In response to the first report of the Scientific Council for Government
Policy (1979),3 in 1983, the government published a memorandum on
minorities. Entitled ‘Minderhedennota’ (Ministerie van Binnenlandse
Zaken 1983), this memorandum accepted the permanency of immigrants’
stay as a starting point for integration policies. Protecting the unity of the
immigrant family thus went unquestioned. In principle, this new approach
made the family part of the integration process. And in practice, family re-
unification (i.e. the bringing over of spouses and children of resident fa-
milies) peaked in the early 1980s. When in the same year the Ministry of
Justice decided to introduce restrictions to family formation (i.e. bringing
over new marriage partners), fierce resistance immediately came from
Dutch progressive parties (PvdA, GroenLinks, SP, D66), who argued that
the measure undermined the principle of equal treatment at the heart of the
new minorities policy. In this regard, liberal family migration policies were
part and parcel of EM Policy, particularly when it came to emphasising so-
cio-economic integration vis-à-vis migrants’ own cultural identity.
The shift in the early 1990s, however, from a group-oriented approach
to one focusing on individual integration, caused a turn away from the
principles of protecting family unity. This neglected the family’s key role
in the development of cultural identity and integration, for the sake of fos-
tering protective measures to promote social cohesion in society (Van
Walsum 2002: 143). In other words, family migration started to be seen as
a problem for the integration of individuals. This reasoning justified restric-
tive family migration policies. As presented in the media and stated in
many public debates, a broad majority within Parliament believed that, due
to a lack of knowledge and skills, those newcomers who immigrated with-
in the framework of family formation or reunification would, if not fail to
integrate, at least retard the integration process. A contrast to the early
1980s, in the 1990s and 2000s, more restrictive family migration measures
were thus introduced with little debate.
As family migration regulations became more and more restrictive, inter-
national treaty obligations, particularly article 8 of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR)’s European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Liberties, became an increasingly important counter refer-
ence. To prevent violations to the right of family life, a clause was intro-
duced in 1994 to the guidelines for police officers known as ‘Instructions
for the Aliens Police’. It stated that the government could – in cases of
‘compelling reasons of a humanitarian nature’ (cited in Bonjour 2006: 15)
– use its own discretion to grant admission to aspiring family members,
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even if predetermined conditions went unmet. As Bonjour observed, this
demonstrates how ECHR article 8 came to be considered an external con-
straint on national policy options. Not only was this a contrast to the ethi-
cal and ideological considerations presented by Dutch parliamentarians in
the 1970s (ibid.: 16), but it also introduced an important new, external ac-
tor in Dutch family migration policymaking.
The current dominant discourse that family migration is a potential
threat for integration is most clearly embodied in a new law passed in
2005. This law requires non-Dutch family members of residents who want
to immigrate to pass an exam that tests their basic knowledge of the Dutch
language as well as how well informed they are about Dutch society. The
exam must be taken in the country of origin and is a requirement for per-
mission to enter the Netherlands on the basis of family reunification.
However, a number of recent verdicts by the ECHR pose significant chal-
lenges to this requirement. In particular, the ECHR has emphasised the
notion that states must allow parents and children the freedom to live to-
gether. Moreover, a recent jurisprudence has stressed the need to respect
the right of both married and unmarried couples to continue cohabiting,
even when issues of immigration or public order are at stake (Van Walsum
2004). What can thus be concluded is that family migration policymaking
has gone beyond the scope of the Dutch political arena, bringing in the EU
and international human rights organisations as potentially important
actors.
3.3 Asylum migration
Asylum policies in the Netherlands have been developed, mainly on an ad
hoc basis, following the increase of asylum seekers during the 1980s and
1990s. From 1977 to 1987, annual quotas were established to determine
the number of refugees invited to resettle in the Netherlands. However, the
growing numbers of spontaneous asylum seekers, a housing shortage and
increased costs that municipalities had to pay for social and other benefits
led to 1987’s introduction of the Regulation on the Reception of Asylum
Seekers (ROA). The first aim of ROA was to curtail giving asylum seekers
access to independent housing and social benefits, and instead to offer
them central reception and modest sums of pocket money. Muus (1997)
observed that ROA, described as ‘austere but humane’, was not only in-
stated to relieve the growing housing and financial problems of the major
cities but also – and above all – to prevent the Netherlands from becoming
an attractive destination country. This shift made evident how reception po-
licies were in fact, and in perception, a significant component for managing
asylum flows.
Due to the growing number of newly arriving asylum seekers from 1989
onwards, ROA became a policy of providing minimal first accommodation,
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yet within a few years it became overburdened. In 1990, for example, the
Ministry of Welfare, Health and Culture, which was in charge of the recep-
tion of asylum seekers, ‘tried to solve the problem by means of buying or
renting holiday bungalows and caravans and finding more municipalities
that were prepared to accommodate asylum seekers’ (Muus 1990: 47).
Consequently introduced in 1992 was the New Admission and Reception
Model for Asylum Seekers (NTOM). An important difference found in
NTOM was that asylum seekers would no longer be accommodated by de-
centralised ROA housing within municipalities, and municipalities would
henceforth only bear responsibility for the reception and integration of
those who had passed asylum procedures, namely status-holders and the
gedoogden (persons with a temporary expulsion waiver).
Moreover, in the early 1990s, the Ministry of Justice introduced several
measures to reduce the number of asylum requests. First and foremost, this
policy was manifested in measures taken to prevent asylum seekers from
even arriving in the Netherlands. For instance, the country’s increasing re-
fusal to grant visas – though not exclusive to asylum seekers – limited en-
trances and hence constrained applications for asylum in the Netherlands.
Secondly, introduced in 1994 was a temporary status referred to as a
Conditional Residence Permit (VVTV). This new status only carries with
it a relatively weak provisional residence title and provides hardly any
access to public facilities. Thirdly, measures were introduced to restrict ac-
cess to asylum proceedings. As other European countries have done so, in
1994, the Netherlands introduced procedures to expedite certain asylum
applications, such as ‘manifestly unfounded applications’, those that were
filed by people coming from safe countries of origin or safe transit coun-
tries where they could have applied for asylum, multiple applications and
other statuses. What’s more, people who had applied elsewhere were ex-
cluded. In the same vein, the new Aliens Act of 2000 introduced a single
temporary status for the first three years of stay in the country, a limit to
the right to appeal a negative decision and the duty of the rejected asylum
seeker to leave the Netherlands within a fixed period.
Analysing the process of policymaking that began in 1986 and which re-
sulted in ROA’s declaration, Puts (1991) observed that government is not a
monolithic actor but, rather, a fragmented organisation. The seeming frag-
mentation of the government may be explained by the fact that its various
ministries have different considerations and concerns. Such examples in-
clude the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Culture’s manageability of re-
ception, the Ministry of Interior’s defence of municipal interests and the
Ministry of Justice’s legal concerns over admission and deportation proce-
dures. But on top of such preoccupations, different dilemmas and ambiva-
lent positions within the ministries have also had to be negotiated. What’s
more, relations between party politics and ministries have wavered. These
differences were finally resolved through compromises, thanks to various
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formal and informal decision-making rules and as the consequence of parti-
cular triggering events.
Since asylum migration policies have been evidently ad hoc and based
on arguments of manageability, rather than on grounds of principles, the
general debate around their formulation and implementation has been
highly technocratic. In this context, the creation of asylum migration poli-
cies has mainly taken place within the government, while there has been
relatively little debate in Parliament. Opposition from lawyers and interest
groups has hardly been a successful means to prevent the introduction of a
series of restrictive measures. Neither cities nor local government have di-
rectly participated in asylum migration policymaking, although they have
been incorporated into the implementation of reception policies process.
As with labour and family migration, a lack of debate and the relatively
low impact of different political and social actors in policymaking led to a
subsiding politicisation of integration and immigration issues. In particular,
two sets of measures aroused concerns and rising responses from external
actors.
In the first place, there was progressive exclusion of failed asylum see-
kers from social benefits and the government’s insistence on their return to
countries of origin. This kind of measure was directly opposed by local
authorities who had to deal with these residents in day-to-day practice.
Notably, in February 2004, when the Tweede Kamer, Dutch Parliament’s
lower house, accepted the Minister for Immigration and Integration’s pro-
posal to expel up to 26,000 failed asylum seekers over the following three
years, many big cities opposed the policy, arguing for their settlement and
integration into Dutch society. Neither did front-line organisations such as
the Central Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) commonly comply with
the Minister’s rulings on this issue. Finally, church organisations and a
strong network of the approximately 10,000 volunteers of the Dutch
Refugee Council came to provide support for these failed asylum seekers.
This opposition by local authorities and grass-roots organisations illustrates
the tension between policy formation at the national level and the often
clashing effects that surface once policy is implemented.
The second set of measures was aimed at reducing the number of asy-
lum applications and the duration of asylum procedures. These measures
have aroused immediate concerns not only from refugee advocacy groups
and academics within the Netherlands, but also from the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Human Rights Watch
(HRW). One basic criticism was that the measures resulted in a ‘routine in-
fringement of asylum seekers’ most basic rights’ (HRW 2003). Other con-
crete disapproval was voiced over the erosion of the Convention Status,
the accelerated procedures and the limit on the right to appeal a negative
decision. This last measure is considered incompatible with ECHR case
law. According to the ECHR, an alien’s claim that his or her deportation
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would result in a violation of ECHR Convention’s article 3 must be rigor-
ously scrutinised by the domestic courts. The fact that in 2003 the Council
of State of the Netherlands replied to these concerns, by arguing that it
does apply the rigorous scrutiny required by the ECHR, again illustrates
how international and supranational institutions are becoming part of the
policymaking process at the national level.
4 Integration policymaking
In comparative perspective, integration policymaking in the Netherlands
followed different timing than that of most other European countries, ex-
cept Sweden. Earlier than elsewhere, the different experiences of immigra-
tion form former colonies and labour migration resulted in systematic ef-
forts to better accommodate newcomers whose stay was more permanent
than originally expected.
4.1 Policies of the 1970s and before
Because the Netherlands did not regard itself an immigration country, those
who happened to be there, such as the guest workers, were expected to re-
turn to their home countries (Scientific Council 2001). As a result, ad hoc
measures for accommodation were the rule, and reception facilities were
short-term-oriented and scarce (Penninx 1996). (The only exception to this
rule was the assimilation policy for repatriates from the former Dutch East
Indies who were seen and treated as compatriots.) Accordingly, the two
main policy goals concerned the remigration and accommodation of guest
workers to Dutch society for as long as they would stay in the
Netherlands. Maintaining migrants’ own identity was thus considered im-
portant, but in one and the same mind frame that viewed migrants as plan-
ning to return to their countries of origin.
In the 1970s, mainly within the Ministry for Culture, Recreation and
Social Work, a welfare policy was developed to respond to the needs of
some vulnerable groups. They included guest workers, asylum seekers, mi-
grants from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, Moluccans and the itin-
erant Dutch people locally known as woonwagenbewoners, literally mean-
ing ‘caravan dwellers’. Within this policy, many private institutions were
initiated and henceforth subsidised to provide welfare services for each of
these groups (Molleman 2004; Blok Commission 2004; Penninx 1979).
Nonetheless, many guest workers’ facilities, such as housing, were sup-
posed to be offered by the companies employing them. Increasing family
reunions, along with the concentration of guest workers and their families
in specific urban areas, pushed local authorities to get involved. Often mu-
nicipalities took their own initiatives in the domains of housing, education,
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health care and welfare, thus pressuring the national authorities to recog-
nise – and to finance – these measures. One of the most notable measures
of the decade was the Mother Tongue and Culture Programme (1974),
which was explicitly aimed at the reintegration of migrant guest workers’
children in their societies of origin. But, contrary to all prognoses, many
guest workers did not return to their sending countries after the recruitment
stopped and the economic crisis that followed in the late 1970s. In fact, mi-
grant communities, particularly those from North Africa and Turkey, grew
significantly through family and asylum migration. The rising unemploy-
ment rates of migrant workers and the arrival of their families brought de-
mands for specific measures onto the political agenda. For instance,
schools with high numbers of immigrant students demanded funds for spe-
cific reception courses, creating the Landelijke Commissie Voortgezet
Onderwijs aan Anderstaligen, a national federation lobbying for the sec-
ondary education of non-native speakers of Dutch.
The administrative layout of the policies described above was proble-
matic. Different ministries were involved for individual target groups and
policy domains. For example, the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Employment, which was responsible for the labour market and work per-
mits, tended to hold onto the idea of the temporality of migration. The
Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work, which oversaw matters
of general welfare, was directly confronted with the problems of reception,
while becoming more aware of the growing tensions between supposed
temporary stay and factual long-term settlement and thus pleaded for
change. There were consequent difficulties in coordinating the measures
among ministries and, what’s more, a certain rivalry existed (Hoppe 1987;
Blok Commission 2004; Penninx 1979; Scholten & Timmermans 2004).4
It was also during the 1970s that scientists started to get involved. As
one of the first to do so, Entzinger (1975) drew attention to the gap be-
tween de facto permanent settlement of immigrants in the country and the
policymaker’s view of temporary migration.5 Entzinger underscored the
risks of ignoring the problem. In 1976, the Ministry of Culture, Recreation
and Social Work instated the Advisory Committee on Research on
Minorities, which united academics in this domain within a policy frame.
In sum, there had been a mixture of pressures for policy change coming
from public opinion, the media, local authorities, academics and civil ser-
vants. It was the Scientific Council for Government Policy’s report ‘Ethnic
Minorities’ (1979) that acted as a catalyst: it pleaded to fully recognise that
a number of immigrant groups had settled permanently in the Netherlands
and to start an active policy aimed at the integration of what it called ‘eth-
nic minorities’ in society. In a first reaction to the report (Ministerie van
Binnenlandse Zaken 1980), the government accepted the advice, decided
to develop an EM Policy and to install a strong coordinating structure for
such policy within the Ministry of Home Affairs. The new direction of
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policies gained full parliamentary support, which was symbolised in a gov-
ernment coalition whereby the Christian Democrats and the Liberals nomi-
nated oppositional Labour Party politician Henk Molleman as director of
the coordination department within the Ministry of Home Affairs.
4.2 Ethnic Minorities Policy in the 1980s
The basic rationale of EM Policy was that specific groups in Dutch society
that had low socio-economic status and were additionally perceived as eth-
nically and/or culturally different would run the risk of becoming perma-
nently marginal groups in society. Low-status immigrant groups thus be-
came target groups of this policy, as did some natives such as the woonwa-
genbewoners and the long-established gypsies. The main principles of the
new EM Policy can be summarised in three points:
1) The policy aimed to achieve equality of ethnic minorities in the socio-
economic domain; inclusion and participation in the political domain;
and equity in the domain of culture and religion within constitutional
conditions.
2) The policy was targeted at specific groups regarded as being at risk of
becoming distinct minorities: guest workers, Moluccans, Surinamese
and Dutch Antilleans, refugees, gypsies and woonwagenbewoners.
3) The policy was to cover all relevant domains and ministries, while being
strongly anchored in the governmental organisation.
As a result, the Directie Coordinatie Integratiebeleid Minderheden, a de-
partment for the coordination of minorities policy, was created within the
general directorate of Home Policies, as opposed to within that of Security
and Order (Molleman 2004). The motivation for placing the coordinating
unit in the Ministry of Home Affairs was that it was a policy for new citi-
zens, and therefore the ministry responsible for cities and provinces should
be in charge.
Emancipation through socio-economic equality and cultural and reli-
gious equity was seen as an important means to prevent ethnic minority
formation among these groups. Thus, their participation in all spheres of
society, including the political, was to be encouraged. An important as-
sumption was that development of identity – both at the individual and
group level – would promote the minority’s emancipation within the com-
munity and would also have a positive influence on its integration in
broader society (Blok Commission 2004). The 1980s have come to be seen
as the heyday of EM Policy. Irrespective of how the outcomes are evalu-
ated, the range of policy initiatives is impressive, especially when com-
pared to other European countries during the same period.
In the legal-political domain, for example, the Netherlands’ full legisla-
tion was scrutinised for discriminatory elements on the basis of nationality,
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race and religion (Beune & Hessels 1983), and many changes were made.
Anti-discrimination legislation was reinforced, and a structure for discrimi-
nation-related reporting and consultation was established. What’s more, in
1985, active and passive voting rights for alien residents were introduced.
In 1986, Dutch nationality law was modified to include more elements of
jus soli, thus making it much easier for alien immigrants and their children
to become Dutch citizens. Over the course of time, a consultation structure
for all target groups of EM Policy was established to give people a voice in
matters regarding their position in society.6 Subsidising EM organisations,
both at national and local levels, and trying to engage them in integration
efforts became an important strategic aspect of policy implementation.
In the socio-economic domain, three themes were key: the labour mar-
ket/unemployment, education and housing. In EM Policy, several initia-
tives were taken to combat high unemployment rates, including a law
inspired by the Canadian Employment Equity Act and even affirmative
action by national and local governmental employers during the period
1986 through 1993. The effects of these measures, however, have proven
weak.
Measures in the domain of education were an important part of EM
Policy from the beginning. By far, most of the policy’s financial resources
were spent in this domain, predominantly on measures to compensate ar-
rears of immigrant children in the regular educational system. That was im-
plemented by a point system in which schools received significantly more
money for children of immigrant background than for standard middle-
class, native pupils. Immigrant and minority children were counted at a rate
of 1.9, while native children of low socio-economic background, at a rate
of 1.25 (the standard was 1). Apart from this general financial assistance to
schools, a relatively small part was also dedicated to specific measures, in-
cluding education in the native language and culture of immigrants.
As for housing, a fundamental change was introduced in 1981 that al-
lowed legally residing aliens full access to social housing, something that
had been previously denied. Given the fact that social housing comprises
the majority of all lodging in big cities in the Netherlands, this measure
had very positive consequences for the position of alien immigrants.
In the domain of culture, language and religion, EM Policy may be
called ‘multiculturally’ avant la lettre.7 The aim to develop migrants’ cul-
ture, in keeping with EM Policy philosophy, was left to the groups and
their organisations, and delimited by laws for general adherence in the
Netherlands. The role of the government was defined as that of facilitating,
i.e. creating opportunities for minorities, such as special media programmes
in immigrant languages.
When it came to faith, ‘new religions’ could legally claim facilities, such
as denominational schools and broadcasting resources, on the same
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conditions as established religions. The outcome was the relatively quick
institutionalisation of Islam (Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk & Meijer 2001).
Throughout the late 1980s, disappointment in EM Policy was growing,
but it was only by the early 1990s that it became the topic of intense public
debate and surrounding criticisms. The first harsh critique of EM Policy
was formulated in a report by the Scientific Council for Government
Policy (1989). Briefly stated, its message was that too little progress was
being made in two crucial domains: labour market and education. This eva-
luation intimated another criticism: too much attention was being given to
issues of multiculturalism and the subsidisation of organisations. It was
feared that this imbalance of attention could result in hindering – rather
than enhancing – individual participation to better labour market and edu-
cational opportunities. The subsequent advice of the Scientific Council
(1989) was to make more effort in the key areas of labour and education,
and to do so with more compulsory measures. ‘Obligations of migrants
should be more balanced with the extended rights’ was the message; poli-
cies should focus less on cultural rights and facilities.
Other elements of criticism were later added. For one, Frits Bolkestein,
then Liberal Party leader and head of the political opposition in Dutch
Parliament, suggested in a public speech in 1991 that Islam formed a threat
to liberal democracy. He also intimated that it was a hindrance to the inte-
gration of immigrants, and that immigrant integration should be handled,
in Bolkestein’s words, ‘with more courage’.
4.3 Integration policy in the 1990s
Policy did not change immediately in response to the criticisms, but sown
were the seeds for a different conception to grow later. A first distinct
change in policy focus was found in the ‘Contourennota’ (Ministerie van
Binnenlandse Zaken 1994). In this new document, a renewed integration
policy with a more ‘republican’ character was adopted, focusing on ‘good
citizenship’ and responsibility for their own situation as guiding principles.
The argument was that citizenship entails not only rights but also duties,
and that each citizen must be active and responsible for himself or herself.
In accordance with advice from the 1989 report of the Scientific Council
for Government Policy, this new ‘integration policy’ reflected three main
deviations from EM Policy: 1) a shift away from target groups to indivi-
duals who are in a disadvantaged position; 2) a strong focus on the socio-
economic incorporation through labour market and education measures; 3)
a shift away from cultural and multicultural policies as well as from the
strong reliance on immigrant organisations.
The social-democrat victory in the national elections of 1994 led to the
so-called Purple Coalition: the Labour Party (PvdA) together with the con-
servative liberals (VVD) and left-wing liberals (D66). This meant that the
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cabinet chose to put ‘the delicate cultural dimension outside of the field
and to focus on the economic activation of individual migrants’ (Scholten
& Timmermans 2004). The focus on economic integration of individual
immigrants recommended by the 1989 Scientific Council report fit very
well with the general policy line of the government, whose motto was
‘work, work, and once again work’.8 Thus, measures specifically targeted
at ethnic minorities were abandoned. From 1997 until 2001, considerable
sums were invested in general schemes to fight unemployment. And
although these schemes were not specifically earmarked for ethnic minori-
ties (Blok Commission 2004), one hope was that they would promote their
participation nevertheless.
A new policy instrument apropos of the new philosophy was that of ci-
vic integration courses9 that aimed to facilitate the initial integration of
newcomers to the Netherlands. This instrument for integration was devel-
oped at the local level among a number of Dutch cities beginning in the
early 1990s. In these reception courses, newcomers were given a toolkit
consisting of Dutch-language training material and information about the
functioning of important institutions in Dutch society. Local policymakers
felt the urge to provide these toolkits to all newcomers, whom they be-
lieved needed them, and so the policy was systematically developed in
their respective cities. However, this instrument for integration was later
consumed by national politics, and through 1998’s Wet Inburgering
Nederland (WIN), the law became national reception policy.
Another way of transforming policies to keep consistent with the new
philosophy was by framing much of integration facilities in area-based po-
licies (rather than group-based ones). In 1994, the Ministry of Home
Affairs began to undertake a policy for deprived areas in major Dutch
cities. This practice could be understood as a replacement of integration
policies, for these targeted areas were largely comprised of ethnic minority
populations. Area was selected as a primary policy category instead of a
group singled out in society. In the mid-1990s emphasis thus shifted from
housing and urban renewal (known in Dutch as sociale vernieuwing) to
more holistic programmes that integrated measures on housing, economic
issues and socio-cultural dimensions (referred to as the grotestedenbeleid).
Reflecting the above-mentioned preoccupations of the Purple Coalition,
this multi-dimensional approach came to focus on socio-economic
development.
The change from group-based towards area-based policies was also insti-
tutionally reflected. In 1998, a new so-called Minister for Urban Policies
and Integration was nominated within the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Although such area-based policies had served as a way of quitting group-
oriented policies, group-specific policies still survived at the local level of
policy.
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A series of events around the turn of the millennium triggered a new
shift in the public and political discourses on immigration and integration
issues, which would prove to later cause a revision of policy towards as-
similationism. This swing brought the social and the cultural dimensions of
integration back onto the agenda, though in a different light than was ever
before shed on the matter. The search was no longer for ‘compatibilities’,
but more for ‘commonalities’ that would help preserve national norms and
values, thereby restoring and enhancing the social cohesion of society.
More and more, the integration issue came to be portrayed in what was
perceived to be a ‘clash of civilizations’.
One of the initial catalysts in this development was the new national de-
bate that was spurred on by the publication of a newspaper article by
Scheffer (2000). The article stated that multicultural society in the
Netherlands could be dismissed as a ‘tragedy’ or a ‘disaster’.10 Integration
policy was declared a failure and, moreover, a call was made for a more
assimilationist policy that would revive Dutch history, norms and values.
As in the first debate over national minorities that took place in 1992,
Islam and the integration of Muslim immigrants were identified as being
especially problematic. International developments such as 9/11 reinvigo-
rated such beliefs. Fennema (2002) has shown how the terrorist attacks
triggered particularly fierce responses in the Dutch media, and led to sev-
eral local incidents of ethnic and religious violence.
In the meantime, the Dutch political arena witnessed the rise of the poli-
tician Pim Fortuyn. A true populist, Fortuyn built up his profile with harsh
statements on criminality, direct democracy, immigration and integration.
He pleaded for ‘zero migration’, argued that ‘the Netherlands was full’ and
called for ‘a cold war against Islam’.11 To these arguments – which were
not completely new – he added two elements: the accusation that the politi-
cal elite had enabled the failure of integration in the past; and the conten-
tion that the victim of all this was the common – and, at that, native –
Dutch voter.
Fortuyn’s populist campaign exploited his discourse very successfully.
Above all, his party won a great victory in March 2002’s local elections in
Rotterdam, the Netherlands’ second largest city. And although only a few
weeks later, Fortuyn was murdered – just before the national elections of
May 2002 – the newly established Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) won a land-
slide victory. In spite of (or perhaps thanks to) his death, the LPF party
gained 26 of the 150 parliamentary seats and thus entered Parliament as its
second-largest party. This success changed the political discourse on immi-
gration and integration radically. In fact, the aftermath of the Fortuyn vic-
tory compelled most other parties to adapt their own ways of speaking
about the issues (Penninx 2006).
Another sequence of notable events followed. It is uncertain as to
whether the events themselves had truly triggered attention to the issues of
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migration and integration, or the already high-alert status of these issues on
the political agenda gave these events the appearance of being trigger
events. First of all, a series of violent acts committed by immigrants drew
broad media attention. Secondly, several events emerged around the issues
of so-called fundamentalist mosques and radical imams. Finally, in 2004, a
major climax came when the Dutch film-maker Theo van Gogh was mur-
dered by a Dutch-Moroccan youngster who was affiliated to a radical
Islamist network in the Netherlands.
These events had two significant effects. First of all, they contributed to
a sense of policy failure. Parliament thus established a Parliamentary
Research Committee on the Integration Policy, comprising MPs of all par-
ties in Parliament, in order to examine ‘why policy had thus far resulted in
such limited successes.’ However, when the Committee concluded that in-
tegration had actually been relatively successful (Blok Commission 2004),
the statement was widely dismissed as being naive. This rejection made
some observers complain that a new ‘political correctness’ had emerged,
thus putting taboos on positive statements on the integration policy and
multiculturalism.12 Secondly, these events reinforced a new mode of policy
discourse, described by Prins (2002) as ‘hyperrealism’. This entailed a shift
from the 1990s ‘realist’ style of discourse – demanding a ‘tough’ approach
to integration so as to turn immigrants into full citizens – to a type of dis-
course in which ‘being tough’ became a goal in itself, regardless of its po-
tentially problematic amplifying effects. As such, it could be argued that
Fortuyn, and later, erstwhile Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration
Rita Verdonk, used the immigration and integration issue to flaunt their
‘tough’ approaches to the political establishment and, in so doing, to pro-
mote their own places in Dutch politics.
4.4 Integration Policy New Style since 2002
Thus, from 2002 onwards, the policy took another turn, as a new political
majority was in power.13 The renewed institutional setting foreshadowed
changes: the coordination of integration policies was moved from the
Ministry of Home Affairs (in which it had been located for 22 years) to the
Ministry of Justice under a new Minister for Aliens Affairs and
Integration. Integration Policy New Style, formulated in a letter by the
Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration (Ministerie van Justitie 2003),
closely follows the paradigm of the 1990s, as based on the leading con-
cepts of ‘citizenship’ and ‘self-responsibility’, though its emphasis was
much more on the cultural adaptation of immigrants to Dutch society. The
concept of integration policy was thus narrowed considerably. In addition,
integration policy had become clearly linked – instrumental even – to im-
migration policy as it facilitated the selection of migrants and restricted
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new flows, particularly those of asylum seekers, family reunion and mar-
riage migration.
The star measure in this new policy was the civic integration of new mi-
grants to the Netherlands, something which was reformulated to serve pur-
poses of both integration and migration control. Since 2006, newcomers
have been obliged to pass an exam that proves their Dutch language skills
and basic knowledge of Dutch culture and society before even entering the
country. Once admitted to the Netherlands, migrants must attend – and suc-
cessfully complete – civic integration courses in order to be granted both
temporary and permanent permit renewals.
The reception policy New Style thus has significant modifications when
held up to the former decade. To begin with, it newly distributes responsi-
bilities among the various partners involved, with the migrants’ own re-
sponsibility being the starting point. As of 2007, newcomers to the
Netherlands have been expected to find and fund the civic integration
courses themselves.14 Only if they pass the exam are they entitled to a re-
fund of up to 70 per cent of their training expenses. In this programme, the
responsibilities of local authorities have changed: although they still have
to monitor newcomers and their efforts to follow courses, their organisa-
tional and financial resources to promote such a process have been
minimised.
As Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration, Verdonk had aimed to
expand the target population of the new reception policy. In her first propo-
sal, the target group for mandatory civic integration courses included all
migrants between ages sixteen and 65, regardless of the amount of time
they had spent in the Netherlands and even if they had been naturalised as
Dutch. Deemed unacceptable by legal authorities and politicians, this pro-
posal was revised with a vision to extend the requirements to everyone
who had completed fewer than eight years of obligatory schooling in the
country. This target would include the so-called oldcomers – people of mi-
grant origin already living in the country – as well as naturalised immi-
grants and native Dutch who had been living abroad. Verdonk also specifi-
cally attempted to extend the requirement to immigrants from the
Netherlands Antilles, justified by the supposedly ‘problematic character’ of
this minority group. The particular proposal, however, was rejected by
Parliament who found it unconstitutional and discriminatory, since Dutch
Antilleans hold Dutch nationality to begin with. A final proposal was ulti-
mately passed at the very end of the cabinet’s legislative term, in July
2006, removing the new reception policy requirements for Dutch citizens –
native or naturalised – and postponed its actual implementation to the next
legislature.
A number of observations can be made regarding content, the policy-
making process and the governance of policy. The first observation is that
immigration and integration policies have been brought together on two
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levels: in terms of content across a number of policy measures; and in their
institutional arrangement within the Ministry of Justice, under the special
Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration.
The second observation is that the process of policymaking – in the con-
text of strong politicisation – is predominantly led, as well as set forth, by
the Minister and the political parties in Parliament. At the same time, this
policymaking process is rather selective in the topics it chooses: restrictive
admission of new immigrants, forced return of failed asylum seekers and
illegal immigrants, and mandatory civic integration courses. Undergoing a
major recentralisation, these new policies were spearheaded from a top-
down approach that was dominated by the Ministry and Parliament.
At the same time, as an observation among people interviewed at the lo-
cal level demonstrates, the majority of existing policies were left untouched
or changed only marginally. Ministries at the national level (such as those
for education, housing and labour market) and local authorities have both
carried on with most of their existing policies. This means that – contrary
to the widespread image – many of the earlier instruments that were devel-
oped through more than 25 years of integration policies are still in place.
Despite the predominant concordance that these policies have failed, they
have had – and still have – their effects (Poppelaars & Scholten 2008).
A fourth observation is that there is growing resistance to the new na-
tional policies, particularly at that local level, coming from both the local
government and civil society at large. Actors that were marginalised by
earlier welfare policies, such as churches and action groups, have become
actively in favour of immigrants, trying to protect them against govern-
mental action deemed unjust. Immigrants themselves – as citizens – are
also becoming important actors, although in a way different from ever be-
fore. The local elections of March 2006 showed that the migrant vote has
become an important instrument for redress, particularly in large Dutch ci-
ties (Van Heelsum & Tillie 2006). In Rotterdam, for example, migrants
have contributed significantly to the exit of the local LPF’s power by vot-
ing systematically for leftist parties and thus bringing the Labour Party
back in. And this has not gone unnoticed by political parties. What’s more,
on the national level, there are growing indications of resistance against
the tone and the content of migration and integration policies. One example
is April 2006’s manifesto of Één land, één samenleving (‘One country, one
society’), which was signed by former politicians from political parties
across the board; another illustration comes from October 2006 when six-
teen university chair-holders in migration and integration studies sent an
open letter to the Eerste Kamer, Dutch Parliament’s upper house, in protest
of the proposed revision of the WIN.
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5 The interaction between immigration and integration
policies
Thus far described have been the dynamics of policymaking in the do-
mains of Dutch immigration and integration policies. It was observed how,
although only gradually, the Netherlands’ identification as a country of de
facto immigration – and possibly even an immigration and/or multicultural
society – triggered responses in both policy fields. This section will look at
the dynamics of the interaction between these two fields. How do patterns
of internal dynamics of immigration and integration policy compare? And
to what extent has there been interaction between developments in these
two policy fields? Before turning to this analysis, some observations on
their differences and similarities will be drawn.
5.1 Patterns of convergence and divergence
Differences between immigration and integration policy fields are first and
foremost demonstrated by the way the subsystems are institutionalised
within the central government. Whereas integration policy has been charac-
terised by a comprehensive or strongly unitary and centralised policy coor-
dination structure, the institutional structure for the coordination of immi-
gration policies appears to have been less comprehensive. Since the early
1980s, integration policies had been assigned within the Ministry of Home
Affairs (until their reassignment to the Ministry of Justice in 2002). Within
this department, a strong – albeit fluctuating – structure was constructed
and maintained to coordinate policies horizontally, between ministries, and
vertically vis-à-vis local authorities, subsidised organisations, co-opted ex-
perts, ethnic elites and civil society actors. This system produced policy
documents, monitored implementation and had an explicit budget (separate
from funds supposed to come from the regular budgets of ministries, muni-
cipalities and other policy actors). In contrast, the institutional location of
immigration policies was (only until recently) far less clear. The Ministry
of Justice had always held formal responsibility over admission of aliens,
residence permits and possible expulsions, but the Ministry was not always
the body to decide on policies regarding admission. This was the case, for
example, with economic and asylum migrants, over whom other depart-
ments shared responsibility. As such, immigration policies were notably
less comprehensive and less unitarily coordinated than integration policies.
Immigration policies were, for a long time, subject to little debate, and ad
hoc policies were usually formulated in response to actual influxes of im-
migrants. Immigration policies thus have long been considered ‘quasi non-
policies’.
Another difference between the two policy fields has, since the 1990s,
become more manifest. While both policies had originated largely on the
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national level, as would be expected in view of the Dutch tradition of a
centralised consensus democracy, they came to develop in different direc-
tions of multilevel governance. Immigration policy has been shifting up-
wards (to the EU level), outwards (among private agencies) and down-
wards (in implementing the Linkage Act, for example). The shift upwards
to the European level has also served to provide new intergovernmental ve-
nues for strengthening national control, as opposed to handing over policy-
making competencies to the supranational level; within the European ‘in-
tergovernmental’ arena there would be less resistance to tightening migra-
tion control than within many national political arenas.
By contrast, a more pronounced trend of recentralisation can be ob-
served in the integration policy. This is especially apparent in terms of pol-
icy formulation and how issues are framed, as well as in the specific topics
that have spearheaded national policies and have been linked to other is-
sues on the national agenda. The 1990s’ trend towards decentralisation had
thus been halted and, to some extent, reversed after the turn of the millen-
nium. In the instance of civic integration courses, the shift outwards to pri-
vate agencies has coincided with the recentralisation of state control over
the courses, as in the case of the national integration exam. At the same
time, however, this top-down dynamics of recentralisation appears to be
limited: the institutional locus of many policy measures, such as in the do-
mains of labour and education, has remained with specific ministries and
local governments, all carrying out their own measures over these files.
This has led to the growing gap between national and local integration po-
licies, similar to the decoupling or ‘décalage’ that Schain (1995) observed
in France. There seems to be an increasing divergence between symbolic
politics at the national level and more pragmatic problem-coping at the lo-
cal level. Only in domains like anti-discrimination is a more significant
trend of Europeanisation apparent.
Similarities in internal policy dynamics between the two policy fields
have been evident as well. Perhaps the most significant convergence is the
politicisation of immigration and integration policymaking over the last
decade. Both have become the subject of intense political debate, often
framed in rather rhetorical and symbolical terms, and dominated by a nega-
tive tone. The attention implies that both policy subsystems have become
less isolated from macro-politics and, what’s more, that they are increas-
ingly vulnerable to external perturbations. Both have become top political
priorities, also in electoral politics, leading to a different logic of policy-
making processes. This has also led to similar patterns of resistance in both
subsystems. Local governments especially have attempted to countervail
the politicising tendencies in immigration and integration policies, calling
for a more positive and pragmatic approach.
Another similarity, related to this politicisation, concerns the growing
gap between policy discourse and policy practice. On the one hand, a
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strong variability in policymaking can be observed over the past decades,
with both domains characterised by episodes of relative stability and then
punctuated by strong changes in the framing of policy. Such fluctuations
make it difficult to evaluate policies, as the rules for measuring success or
failure have also been in constant flux. On the other hand, policy practice
has shown what appears to be a strong tendency towards path dependency.
Policy practices that were established in one policy episode have often pro-
ven very resilient in periods that follow. For instance, the Mother Tongue
and Culture Programme had a chameleon-like existence – with its multiva-
lent contributions to return migration in the 1970s, to multicultural society
in the 1980s and to acquisition of Dutch-as-second-language in the 1990s
– before being finally abandoned in 2001. Another example of policy resi-
lience is shown by the persistence of labour migration long after its official
termination in 1973 into the present day – despite all the discourse on
bringing it to an end. National politics’ tough rhetoric on illegal migration
notwithstanding, actual policy practices vis-à-vis illegal migrants seem
much more subtle. The growing gap between policy rhetoric and policy
practice emerges as the result of a general institutional path dependency, as
well as the diverging patterns of multi-level governance (albeit manifested
in distinctly unique ways in the immigration and integration policy
domains).
5.2 Interaction between immigration and integration policy fields
The early 1980s interpreted the arrivals of newcomers as historically un-
ique events. As such, there was demand for a minorities’ policy for these
groups as well as a restrictive immigration policy in order to prevent
further immigration. A restrictive immigration policy was then justified as
a necessary condition for a successful EM Policy: a constant influx of new
immigrants would create a constant demand for new policy efforts.
Such an understanding of the relation between immigration and integra-
tion policies changed in the 1990s. The 1989 report of the Scientific
Council for Government Policy called for more realistic recognition of the
permanent character of immigration. Not only would the presence of mino-
rities, but also of immigration itself, be responsible for creating a perma-
nent phenomenon in Dutch society. While the report supported a restrictive
immigration policy, it also suggested adaptations in the integration policy
so as to cope with the constant influx of newcomers. In this vein, it recom-
mended the development of civic integration programmes that would pro-
vide the link between the continuously arriving newcomers and their sub-
sequent integration in Dutch society.
This definition of the correlation between immigration and integration
was largely adopted by government of the early 1990s. It soon led the gov-
ernment to abandon the preceding decade’s relatively lenient policies on
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family migration, which came to be viewed as a growing problem for inte-
gration. But there were also ideas within governmental circles that took
some steps further. By the end of the 1980s, the Interdepartmental
Working Group on Immigration (IWI), which was chaired by the Justice
Department, argued that a realistic recognition of the nature of immigration
should generate more than mere efforts to optimally restrict immigration.
What needed to be accounted for was the ‘immigration effect’ that was en-
abled by the very facilities to which minorities had access under the inte-
gration policy. In short, immigration was not only to be restricted so as to
promote integration, but integration policy should also be less generous so
as not to encourage further immigration.
Since 2000, Dutch society has witnessed the development of a more sys-
temic connection between immigration and integration. Not only do policy
memoranda explicitly address the need to restrict immigration so as to not
endanger the ‘absorption capacity’ of Dutch society, but more stringent in-
tegration policies have increasingly become a tool for restricting immigra-
tion. The new reception programmes described above have become a way
for the Dutch government to promote the integration of newcomers, as well
as to discourage further immigration. In doing so, the programmes simulta-
neously function as a mechanism through which to select those migrants
who could prove beneficial for the Dutch economy.
6 External factors
Although it is useful to focus on internal mechanisms in the immigration
and integration policy fields, these observations are not unrelated to more
general characteristics of Dutch society and its development. Three major
developments, it seems, have had a particular influence on the process of
policymaking on migration and immigrant integration in the Netherlands.
They are the legacy of pillarisation, the Dutch welfare state and the politi-
cal culture of the Netherlands during the past decades.
6.1 The legacy of pillarisation
The legacy of pillarisation is an oft-raised explanation for Dutch exception-
alism in many domains (Hoppe 1987). Beginning in the mid-19th century,
the Netherlands had grown into a segmented society that was structured
around four ‘pillars’. The pillars comprised specific social, political or reli-
gious groups – Protestants, Catholics, Socialists, Liberals – and were
brought together only at the top where any inter-pillar conflict would be
‘pacified’ by elites of the pillars. This particular facet of Dutch history has
had pervasive effects on the country’s culture and the structure of its politi-
cal system as a ‘centralized consensus democracy’ (Lijphart 1968). Since
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the 1960s, secularisation and individualisation came to erode the social ba-
sis of Dutch society’s once pillarised structure. The role of religious institu-
tions in society gradually decreased, their relation to the nation-state was
loosened and a new notion of citizenship emerged to create a direct con-
nection between individuals and the nation-state.
These changes notwithstanding, pillarisation has had an important influ-
ence on immigrant integration policies in two basic ways. The first way re-
lates to how migrants themselves were ‘framed’. Whereas in other
European countries immigrants were defined on the basis of class, race or
colour, in the Netherlands, they were defined as ethno-cultural groups and
‘minorities’. Framing immigrants as minorities reflected the Dutch style of
an accommodating pluralism: defining immigrants as another minority
added to all those already existing. In addition, the pillarist tradition was
reflected in how immigration and integration issues were coped with. The
fragile coalition system of Dutch politics, a legacy in the history of pillar-
ism, demanded that politically sensitive issues, such as immigration and in-
tegration, be depoliticised so as to avoid centripetal forces. For example,
‘playing the race card’ for electoral gain could drive the political system
apart. Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, these issues were systematically
depoliticised, accommodating conflict within relatively closed networks of
policymakers, experts and ethnic elites. Issues ‘too hot to handle’ for poli-
tics were resolved through technocratic compromise, creating a so-called
‘consensual style’ of applying expertise as an authoritative source to create
political consensus, rather than imposing such a consensus through open
political confrontation. But this style of policymaking started to break
down in the 1990s, giving way to a much more conflictive style after the
turn of the century.
The second way pillarisation has proven influential is in the institutiona-
lisation of laws and regulations. Steady secularisation of the Dutch popula-
tion and decreasing significance of pillar institutions and organisations not-
withstanding, laws and regulations have not changed that much. Although
ethnic minorities themselves never were as cohesive, sizeable and strong as
the traditional pillars of the Netherlands used to be, the institutional legacy
provided minorities with opportunities for the development of some of
their own institutions. Legal provisions of all kinds disseminated on an
equal basis, led, for instance, to the recognition and establishment of
Islamic institutions in the Netherlands. State-subsidised Islamic schools
and an Islamic broadcasting organisation are remarkable examples. It was
only from the 1990s onwards that such developments became politically
contested.
THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS 155
6.2 Welfare state regime
Another factor that has had a significant impact on immigration and inte-
gration policymaking is the development of the Dutch welfare state over
the past decades. The Dutch welfare state regime has traditionally been
classified as conservative-corporatist. This type of state involves a rela-
tively high level of decommodification of citizens from market forces and
the strong involvement of state and civil society actors, such as churches,
labour unions and employers’ unions, in welfare state provisions. This
model does not encourage universal labour participation among indivi-
duals, but tends to preserve the prevailing socio-cultural structure of so-
ciety as expressed in family, class, status and, to some extent, also gender.
It was in the context of this welfare state regime that Dutch integration po-
licies began developing in the 1980s. This was reflected in a policy that
did not see immigrants exclusively as part of market forces, but also en-
couraged them to become emancipated and recognised cultural groups in
Dutch society.
The end of the 1980s reveals poor results vis-à-vis the socio-economic
aspect of EM Policy. There was a general, fact-supported consensus that
EM policies in the field of labour were ineffective throughout the 1980s,
as manifested in continued high unemployment and the low labour market
participation among immigrants. The position of constant weakness experi-
enced by minorities was due to the general restructuring of Dutch econo-
my, with its particular consequences on immigrants, as well as the result of
deficiencies in the Dutch welfare state. It was argued that the lenient
regime of access to benefits had turned minorities too much into ‘welfare
categories’ trapped in, and overly dependent on, state provisions. By then,
the welfare state’s viability had also become questionable for a number of
reasons. Thus, the issues of immigration and integration and the need for
welfare state retrenchment were brought together, producing a new per-
spective. The same Scientific Council pleaded in several reports for a more
proactive type of welfare state by a more liberal regime. For immigrants,
this meant encouraging them to ‘stand on their own feet’, as well as dis-
cussing their civic rights and duties as new citizens.
The rise of the 1990s Integration Policy was thus closely related to the
general reform of the welfare state at the time, particularly involving a re-
calibration of the responsibilities of citizen, state and market. State interfer-
ence vis-à-vis the socio-cultural position of immigrants gradually lost im-
portance. Immigrants came to be treated more as ‘citizens’ endowed with
specific civic responsibilities. Civic integration became a specific new in-
strument to ‘equip’ immigrants so they might live up to their civic respon-
sibilities for integrating into Dutch society. The relation between welfare
state reform and restrictive immigration policy was embodied in the
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Linkage Act, which excluded all illegal residents from facilities of the wel-
fare state.
Recent policy has witnessed the addition of a new element to the logic
of political discourse. Whereas the articulation of socio-cultural differences
has traditionally been perceived as a ‘corroding effect’ on social cohesion,
it may, in the same vein, be seen as undermining the type of social solidar-
ity necessary to maintain a viable welfare state (Entzinger 2006). As such,
the basic issue is no longer how to promote socio-economic participation
in order to keep the welfare state affordable, but rather, how to maintain
social cohesion and solidarity in order to generate sufficient support for the
welfare state.
6.3 The macro-political context
Finally, in the early 2000s, the style of politics shifted from conflict accom-
modation and de-politicisation towards primacy of politics and a more con-
frontational political culture. In this context, immigration and integration
policy have become the playing fields for this new political style. This
new style has had serious consequences for actors such as experts and eth-
nic elites. For example, 2004 witnessed the fierce contestation of the role
of experts in this policy domain. Politics and media criticism emerged con-
cerning how the development of policy ideas might in fact be in the hands
of ‘scientists who have multiculturalist biases’ (see Scholten 2011). The
technocratic relationship between science and politics characterising this
domain in earlier periods was now dismissed as undemocratic. As a conse-
quence, the consensual style of using expertise in policymaking and imple-
mentation was now replaced by a more selective ‘pick-and-choose’ strategy
aimed at scientific expertise.
Immigration and integration policies appear to have been as much a
cause – as an effect – of macro-political developments. Immigration and
integration were at the centre of the Fortuyn Revolt, whose leader
exploited such issues as a vehicle for political designs. As Dutch govern-
ment and democracy malfunctioned, the issues were subsequently turned
into scapegoats for broader popular dissent. For the 2002 and 2003 parlia-
mentary elections, immigration and integration became central electoral
issues unlike ever before. The failing integration policies and an alleged
ignorance towards public concerns about immigration and integration be-
came the greater symbols of a failing political system. In response, govern-
ment and politicians politicised the issues more than ever before, a phe-
nomenon that has recently been described as the ‘articulation function’. In
this light, politics is seen as naming and articulating the public’s sentiments
and problems. Integration is here interpreted as encompassing something
broader than mere immigrant integration: namely, the integration of immi-
grants and natives within a multicultural society.
THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS 157
7 Conclusions
The Dutch case reveals a sequence in policymaking: from the 1970s’ ad
hoc policy responses to a technocratic type of policymaking throughout the
1980s and 1990s, and finally, to the more symbolic politics that began in
2002. In a certain respect, the Netherlands’ development differs from other
European countries. For instance, in the United Kingdom, immigration and
integration were politicised at a much earlier point in history and the model
of policymaking was bottom-up rather than top-down. The Netherlands
also proves different from Germany where, although politicisation was also
held off for considerable time, recently a pragmatic approach of coping
with integration problems has come to persist. Similarities, however, are
found in the way French policymaking has developed. As in the
Netherlands, a pragmatic approach to coping with problems was initially
exchanged for a form of technocratic governance, eventually to be replaced
by symbolic politics. Still, this development occurred at a much quicker
pace: the subsystem of technocratic governance was already emerging in
the 1970s with the politics of insertion, and a politicised form of symbolic
politics showed up by the early 1980s following the rise of the Le Pen
Movement.
The perceived Dutch exceptionalism in immigration and integration pol-
icymaking stems, in particular, from the combination of a persistent top-
down policy formulation and what was a relatively late politicisation of the
topics. More than elsewhere, immigration and integration policies have
been formulated mainly at the national level, within centralised and
strongly institutionalised structures involving the participation of a limited
number of actors. The scale of public debate was actively limited for a
considerable time, thus evading the politicisation of these sensitive issues.
This chapter has thereby put forward some explanations for the apparent
Dutch exceptionalism. First analysed, in terms of an internal dynamics,
was how specific patterns of governance could persist in the Netherlands
for such an extended period. Given the societal definitions that separated
immigration from integration – and thanks to the subsequent de-politicisa-
tion of the topics – specific policy coalitions could develop. When it came
to integration, iron triangles supported group-specific policies in the 1970s,
to be succeeded in the next decade by the strongly centralised technocratic
structure. As for immigration, the topic has long been implicitly defined as
a ‘non-issue’, thus resulting in ad hoc, reactionary policies. This was criti-
cised during the 1990s, though the system simultaneously showed a great
resistance to change. It was after the turn of the millennium, when this pat-
tern of governance disappeared, that the two policy topics became tied up
together as issues of high politics.
On an altogether different level, this chapter also explored external fac-
tors that could account for exceptionalism. First of all, the Dutch legacy of
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pillarisation, in the form of a political culture of conflict accommodation
and consensus-seeking, may explain why policymaking has for so long re-
mained behind closed doors in the Netherlands. This history of pillarisation
contributed to framing immigrants as ‘minorities’, as well as to the initial
development of a multicultural policy approach. It may also have contribu-
ted to a tendency to depoliticise issues, such as immigration and integra-
tion, that were ‘too hot to handle’ for politics. The Fortuyn Revolt led to
the emergence of a more confrontational political style, which may be in-
terpreted as much as a revolt against the legacy of pillarisation as against
specific immigration and integration policies.
Furthermore, changes in the Dutch welfare state – from a corporatist
model to a neo-liberal one – have been cited as catalysts for modifying
policy objectives and their target populations. As immigration and integra-
tion became issues of electoral politics, they came to merge with macro-po-
litical issues such as a collective unease with the Dutch political establish-
ment and concerns about national identity and social cohesion. As such,
the issues have become symbols for a ‘New Politics’ that tries to regain
popular legitimacy by articulating the voice of ‘the ordinary citizen’ and
adopting a neo-conservative line of tough policies.
Notes
1 In recent times, allochtoon – which refers to the Netherlands’ allochthonous popula-
tion, literally meaning ‘from foreign soil’ – has become the standard Dutch term
used in statistics and policy. Technically, an allochtoon is defined as a person born
outside the Netherlands (i.e. a ‘real’ immigrant) or a person with at least one parent
who was born outside the continental Dutch territory. Within the allochthonous po-
pulation, a further distinction is made between ‘Western allochthones’ (roughly refer-
ring to those coming from Europe and industrialised countries) and ‘non-Western
allochthones’.
2 Arrival of inhabitants from former and present Dutch colonies or parts of the
Netherlands Kingdom was not, by definition, seen as immigration. Its regulation
was based on recognition of an individual’s Dutch citizenship. In the case of repatri-
ates from Indonesia, this meant that only those who had natural or acquired Dutch
citizenship could ‘repatriate’. Repatriates as such included Dutch citizens who had
settled in the Dutch East Indies and those born of mixed relations who were ‘recog-
nised’ by the Dutch partner involved. Inhabitants of Surinam and the Netherlands
Antilles were citizens of the Netherlands Kingdom, according to the Treaty of 1954,
and were thus free to move. This changed for Surinam in November 1975, when the
country gained independence and thus created Surinamese citizenship. During the
transition period from 1975 to 1980, however, many Surinamese individuals suc-
cessfully claimed their Dutch citizenship.
3 The Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) is an advisory body that gives
solicited and unsolicited advice to the national government on all kinds of policy
issues.
4 Such challenges among coordination efforts were brought to the political fore in a
1978 parliamentary motion (motion Molleman, PvdA) in which the Minister of
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Home Affairs was asked to take responsibility for coordinating policy pertaining to
all minorities. This idea was later realised in 1980 when the government decided to
work towards the general EM Policy.
5 Notably, Han Entzinger was working at the staff department of the Ministry of
Culture, Recreation and Social Work when he wrote the 1975 article referenced here.
6 In 1985, the National Advisory and Consultation Body (LAO) was established so as
to represent ethnic minorities through their own organisations. The LAO was to ad-
vise the government on issues of immigrant integration and to be consulted on ad-
ministrative issues vis-a`-vis integration policy. In 1997, the LAO was replaced by the
National Consultation Body for Minorities (LOM), an institution with a weaker
mandate.
7 The policy documents of 1981 and 1983 do not employ the term ‘multiculturalism’.
Particularly by adversaries, referring to EM Policy as consisting of ‘multiculturalist’
policies is something that was only later introduced.
8 Top measures included those such as the subsidised Melkert jobs for the long-term
unemployed.
9 These courses are known in Dutch as inburgeringscursussen. The word ‘inburgering’
contains the word ‘burger’ (meaning ‘citizen’), but its denotation is not that of natur-
alisation (i.e. becoming a national citizen) as much as that of becoming a well-in-
formed, active participant in society. For the sake of clarity, the authors of this chap-
ter prefer the term ‘civic integration courses’ rather than ‘citizenship programmes’,
for the courses do not necessarily prepare people for national citizenship.
10 The meaning depends on one’s translation of the Dutch word ‘drama’ in the title of
the article ‘Het multiculturele drama’.
11 Interview published in the newspaper De Volkskrant 2 November 2001.
12 TK (Tweede Kamer), 6 April 2004, 63-4112.
13 Cabinet Balkenende I was a short-lived coalition of Christian Democrats, liberals
and the extreme-right LPF; it was followed in 2003 by Cabinet Balkenende II, a coa-
lition in which the LPF was substituted by the progressive liberals of D66.
14 Another element introduced – without much debate – since implementation of New
Style integration policy concerns financial implications: all costs of admission and
immigration for the state are to be borne by the immigrants themselves. This means
that immigrants have to pay sums of money for visas and residence permits, as well
the renewal of them – this was previously unheard of. The application for a tempor-
ary residence permit costs E 430 (its renewal E 285 per family member), and for a
permanent residence permit, E 890 (VluchtelingenWerk Nederland 2004).
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